Are utterance truth-conditions systematically determined?

Truth-conditions are systematically determined when they are the output of an algorithmic procedure that takes as input a set of semantic and (optionally) contextual features. Truth-conditional sceptics have cast doubts on the thesis that truth-conditions are systematic in this sense. Against this form of scepticism, Schoubye and Stokke ([2016]. "What is said?" Nous 50 (4): 759-793) and Dobler ([2019]. "Occasion-sensitive semantics for objective predicates." Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (5): 451-474.) have provided systematic analyses of utterance truth-conditions. My aim is to argue that these theories are not immune to the kind of objections raised by truth-conditional sceptics. In particular, I argue that the use of Questions Under Discussion (Schoubye and Stokke) and ways of being (Dobler) is problematic.